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 1
Introduction
During the 1990s e￿orts to foster integration of the European market were intensi￿ed
which led to an increase in the degree of integration. The single most outstanding event
in the decade was the introduction of the common currency. This had - amongst other
reforms - a strong impact on ￿nancial markets. Out of ￿nancial markets the money
markets experienced the main push toward one single integrated market. Arbitrage
opportunities were essentially reduced by the introduction of one currency managed
by a single monetary authority through a single interest rate as well as a single Euro-
area wide payment system. Another indication for the increased integration is the
stark increase in intra-EMU cross-border interbank lending over the 1990s till now.
(Hartmann, Maddaloni & Manganelli 2003)
The integration of capital markets is not so pronounced, but there is evidence that
capital market movements have synchronized over the last decade. (see Fratzscher 2001)
The lesser degree of integration in capital markets points at factors which cannot simply
be eliminated by the removal of cross-border transaction risk, stemming from exchange
rates and divergent interest rates.
Therefore di￿erences in ￿nancial structure were preserved in the course of European
￿nancial integration. As a result, intermediaries, which are of considerable importance
within the ￿nancial structure of economies, play di￿erent roles, which is reinforced
by the fact that only few cross-country mergers were observed in the EMU area until
2002.(see Schmidt 2001) The concentration on bank lending as well as the lack to draw
resources from capital markets directly might also be rooted in the origin of the legal
system in the country under consideration, as was put forward by a number of authors
such as La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de
Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1998) and Cechetti (1999). Summing up, ￿nancial structure
will have a considerable impact on the operation and e￿ects of the European central
bank and is likely to lead to asymmetries in the European monetary transmission.
(Mojon 2000)
As Amable (2003) demonstrates, even though there was some considerable trans-
formation of ￿nancial structures within the last twenty years, most notably in France
(compare also Hackethal, Schmidt & Tyrell 2002) due to privatisation of the banking
sector and capital market reforms, through privatisation of parts of the economy other
than banking and pension reforms, ￿nancial structures are far from being uniform. This
assigns di￿erent importance to intermediaries such as banks throughout Europe. Banks
will, depending on the environment they operate in, reinforce or stand against actions
of the central bank. In bank-based ￿nancial systems, they will stand by their related
customers and provide resources even in a time of monetary tightness. Ehrmann, Gam-2
bacorta, Sevestre & Worms (2003) stress the importance of banking networks, such as
loan cooperatives and savings banks in some EMU economies like France, Germany,
Austria and Finland. The question that therefore arises is whether di￿erences in ￿nan-
cial structure in Europe facilitate the operation of monetary policy of the European
Central Bank or not as ￿nancial structure seems to determine the nature of monetary
transmission mechanism through interest rate setting behaviour.
Cottarelli & Kourelis (1994) were the ￿rst to estimate the degree and speed of pass-
through of interest rates trying to link the e￿ects of monetary policy in various countries
on banks and explaining it by ￿nancial structure variables. They show that there is
signi￿cant in￿uence of ￿nancial structure on the monetary transmission mechanism
which di￿ers between various countries. There are three other studies that seem to be of
importance for the topic above. Mojon (2000) estimates the interest pass-through by a
vector error correction model (VECM) for a rather large variety of di￿erent interest rates
for some economies of the Euro area for various subsamples up until 1998. Therefore
it is not possible to draw any conclusions about the e￿ects of the introduction of the
common currency. de Bondt (2005) also estimates interest pass-through VECMs for the
Euro area as a whole between 1996 and 2001. Again, as for Mojon this speci￿cation does
not allow to test for convergence issues as a VECM implies that there is no adjustment
to a new equilibrium but to the old. This is unlikely to occur when a new policy regime
like a common currency is introduced. With respect to convergence Haan, Sturm &
Toolsema (2001) provide interesting insights. In contrast to de Bondt (2005) they
estimate interest channels for a small set of individual member states of the European
union. They secondly let the pass-through parameters in contrast to VECMs vary over
time to tackle the question whether di￿erences in interest pass-through across countries
vanish over time due to the introduction of the Euro. They ￿nd however little evidence
of convergence, but this may be due to the relatively short span of the Euro in operation.
This paper tries to redo on the one hand the analysis of Haan et al., as we have a longer
period of the Euro in operation. On the other hand it goes beyond their analysis in terms
of countries covered and the convergence analysis undertaken combined with ￿nancial
structure considerations. Thirdly it investigates the role of ￿nancial structure as an
explanation for the di￿erences in the immediate interest pass-through in the European
economies under consideration.
To test for the in￿uence of the ￿nancial structure the following hypotheses will be
evaluated:
Hypothesis 1 There is convergence in the transmission mechanism within the EMU
member states.
Hypothesis 2 There is faster convergence between countries with similar ￿nancial3
structures than between economies with di￿erent ￿nancial structures.
Hypothesis 3 Due to the rigidity of ￿nancial structures there will not be any signif-
icant speeding up of convergence in the European monetary transmission mecha-
nism due to the introduction of the Euro.
These three hypotheses lie at the heart of this paper. The ￿rst tests whether there is
convergence at all. Given that there is convergence hypothesis 2 states that one should
see a faster pace of convergence between countries with similar ￿nancial structures which
was not considered in Haan et al. (2001). The third hypothesis then aims to disentangle
exchange rate risk and the ￿nancial structure e￿ect. So if all three hypotheses cannot
be rejected we have established that it is the ￿nancial structure that is important for
the degree of asymmetry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 estimates and discusses
the main characteristics of the underlying econometric model. The second part (1.2) will
present the main results of the ￿rst step of the analysis. Section two presents the three
ways convergence and ￿nancial structure are linked in the paper, Sigma convergence,
cluster methods and panel regression analysis.
1 The E￿ects of Monetary Policy
1.1 The model
In this section we estimate the pass-through of monetary policy impulses through the
banking system of most old-EU economies. Even though this was done to some extent
by Mojon (2000) the speci￿cation di￿ers in this study as we take into account the
dynamics of monetary integration. In contrast to Mojon (2000) the rolling regression
technique is used to assess the time variation in the estimators. Furthermore we do
not estimate cointegrating relationships between bank and policy interest rates as it is
not clear whether there exists such a stable relationship or whether it has changed due
to the introduction of the Euro. In this case we would estimate something that does
not exist, a stable long run relationship between bank lending and money market rates.
The data coverage is the third distinguishing feature of this analysis. Last but not least,
due to data availability, only a general bank lending rate instead of more precise bank
interest rates was used. As a baseline, the model used is due to Cottarelli & Kourelis
(1994), which also forms the basis of Mojon’s (2000) model.
Cottarelli & Kourelis (1994) model assumes that ￿nancial intermediaries such as
banks are not neutral conveyors of monetary policy impulses. This is motivated by the
observation that bank rates are relatively inelastic with respect to shifts in the demand4
for loans as well as deposits and that bank rates change less in magnitude than do
money market rates.
As a ￿rst step, an equation that links bank lending rates to money market and
discount rates is considered1:
∆ij,t = αj,1 + αj,2∆ij,t−1 + βj,0∆dj,t + ... + βj,k∆dj,t−k +
γj,0∆mj,t + ... + γj,n∆mj,t−n + uj,t, (1)
where ∆ij,t, ∆mj,t and ∆dj,t represent changes of the lending rate, money market rate
and the discount rate at t for country j, where j = 1,...J. The values of β and γ
will vary over the countries in the sample, therefore there will be a di￿erent degree
of stickiness in the interest rates in every country. From the βs or γs, various sets of
multipliers are derived, which will be in general nonlinear functions of the two parameter
sets, and are given by
hm,0 = γj,0, (2a)
hd,0 = βj,0. (2b)
hm,t+p = α
p
j,2γj,0 + ... + αj,2γj,p−1 + γj,p =
p X
i=0
α
p−i
j,2 γj,i, (3a)
hd,t+p = α
p
j,2βj,0 + ... + αj,2βj,p−1 + βj,p =
p X
i=0
α
p−i
j,2 βj,i. (3b)
In the discussion we shall however mainly focus on the money market multiplier,
taking into account the direct e￿ect of monetary policy in some countries.
1.2 Results
Before showing the multipliers implied by the estimated country models, a few words
about the model selection methodology. The country models are based on Cottarelli
and Kourelis, and the optimal lag length was chosen by minimizing the AIC criterion.
As during the 1980s monetary policy did not solely rely on discount rate manipulation,
1This equation corresponds to Cottarelli & Kourelis’s (1994) model 2. Model 1 is in levels for the
lending rates and money market rates, whereas the discount rate is in di￿erences. The reason for that
is that they want to control for policy changes which are signals to the market. Model 2 was chosen
because nearly all interest rates of the countries investigated here are not stationary in levels, so that
a model in ￿rst di￿erences is more appropriate.5
but also on other means such as credit control, the model selection was also undertaken
between estimating a pure bank lending lending rate and money market rate model as
well as a model that additionally included the discount rate of the central bank in the
respective country. There is evidence in nearly every country, as ￿gure 5 points out,
that excluding the discount rate for the whole sample leads to a misspeci￿cation of the
interest pass-through models as there is additional information in the discount rate,
that is not captured by variation in the money market rates only.
For the assessment of the impact of European monetary policy discount rates of
central banks exert a statistically positive in￿uence on bank lending behavior. Not
taking this into account leads to misspeci￿ed models for these countries.
Figure 5 in the appendix plots the di￿erence of absolute values between the absolute
value of the AIC of the money market rate only model and the absolute value of the AIC
of the model also including the discount rates over time. If the di￿erence is positive, then
we would select the money market rate only model, if negative we would do the opposite.
In case of Belgium, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands it can be seen that the inclusion
of the discount rate makes the mixed speci￿cation better over time, whereas in France
and Finland the di￿erence is stable at slightly below zero. For the case of Austria and
the UK the money market rate only speci￿cation is preferable. Nevertheless in order
to ensure comparability with the other models the discount rate was included. For
Finland the money market only model was chosen, as there is not that a big di￿erence
between both speci￿cation on the one hand and because the discount rate series for
Finland only just begins in 1987, which considerably restricts the number of estimation
subperiods. The exact speci￿cations which were chosen are shown in appendix B.
The money market multipliers
Figure 1 shows some important results. Only the impact multipliers are shown , but
￿gures (6) and (7) in the appendix will show some of the patterns at the beginning and
at the end of the sample period. As these ￿gures show, the model mainly characterizes
the ￿rst four periods following a money market rate shock. For the ￿fth and sixth we
￿nd hardly any signi￿cant movement. This is in line with the analysis of Cottarelli &
Kourelis, as they have ￿rstly set up a model which analyzes the short run e￿ects only,
which secondly produces signi￿cant multipliers up to the third lead. This can be also
justi￿ed on the basis of economic theory as in the long(er) run other factors such as the
demand for loans are important determinants for bank lending rates.
The impact multipliers for market oriented economies like the Netherlands or the
UK are stronger than for typical bank-based economies such as Germany. Also, as
Hackethal et al. (2002) and Amable (2003) explain, France is moving toward the group
of market-oriented economies due to structural reforms in the mid-1980s. This develop-
ment becomes dominant at the end of the time span. Thus, the French banks’ response6
Figure 1: Impact Multipliers
to money market movements is stronger in latter regressions than in previous.
Belgium and Austria deserve special attention. According to Amable (2003) Belgium
displays the second lowest intermediation ratio of all EMU countries with a declining
tendency. As a consequence it is not surprising that money market impulses are trans-
mitted quite strongly. On the other hand Austria remains puzzling. As Amable shows
Austria has by far the persistently highest degree of intermediation, which could explain
the outstandingly high transmission after three months. But what remains puzzling is
the high degree of transmission at impact.
2 Impact of Financial Structure
To link the multipliers to ￿nancial structure variables, Cottarelli & Kourelis (1994)
suggest that they depend on the structural features of the ￿nancial structure of the
economy:
hj,l = Zjηl + υj,l , (4)7
where Zj is a n-element vector describing the ￿nancial structure of the economy j
and υj,l are errors that are not correlated between the countries. Taking together all
countries the multiplier system can be re-written in the following matrix form:
h0 = Zη0 + υ0 , (5)
where Z is a J × K matrix and l = 0, so that h0 is the impact multiplier. In a similar
manner medium and long term multipliers can be formulated,
hl = Zηl + υl. (6)
These equations enable us to study the e￿ects of ￿nancial structure on the e￿ects of
monetary policy in the various countries. While section 2 will deal with the multipliers
and look at the development of these over time, section 3 will discuss the direct e￿ect
of ￿nancial structure on the transmission of monetary impulses.
The empirical model combined with the rolling regression technique allows to track
changes in the relationships we are interested in. There are various ways to characterize
￿nancial structures of economies: We consider two concepts, the ￿rst being the legal
family concept due to La Porta et al. (1997) and for the second we follow the grouping
by Amable (2003).
The idea behind the concept ￿rst introduced by La Porta et al. (1997) is that the
legal origin of the countries’ law code matters for the role capital markets play within
the economy, as they di￿er with respect to shareholder and investor protection. They
globally ￿nd four main families:
1. common law (English)
2. civil law
(a) French
(b) Scandinavian
(c) German
Civil law countries do give fewer rights to parties in capital markets, but the rights
are strongest enforced in German and Scandinavian countries.
By principal component and cluster analysis Amable (2003) pins down four groups
which are similar to the legal family grouping, but not entirely the same. He ￿nds a
factor that explains 45 percent of the total variation, and which is de￿ned by negative
and positive components:8
1. negative: stock market cap. to GDP, ownership of large listed companies, per-
centage of share held by institutional investors, M&A activity, accounting stan-
dards, importance of venture capital
2. positive: ownership concentration, scope of public ownership % the public sec-
tor, control of large ￿rms by families, share of bonds in institutional investors’
portfolios
From this ￿rst step he performs a cluster analysis and ￿nds four groups,
1. high level of protection, high importance of stock markets and institutional in-
vestors, low public ownership
USA, Canada, UK, Switzerland, Australia and Japan
2. larger than average control of ￿rms by ￿nancial institutions
France, Norway and Sweden
3. low importance of family control
Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Austria
4. ownership concentration, lack of coherence to international accounting standards,
low M&A activity, low development of capital markets
Germany, Spain, Italy Portugal and Greece
These two groupings will be taken as proposed by theory in the ￿rst two sections
of the section. To gain more robust evidence the following three ways are undertaken
to assess potential changes, Sigma convergence, cluster analysis and panel regression
analysis.
2.1 Sigma-Convergence
2.1.1 Concept
The concept of σ-convergence originally stems from the growth literature. It states
that there is convergence (in growth) between a group of economies if the variation (in
growth rates) within the group declines over time. This is of course a more general idea
that is also applicable to other notions of convergence as well.
More explicitly, we are interested in the development of some kind of dispersion
measure such as the standard deviation,
σK =
v u u
t
K X
j=1
(mj − mK)2 , (7a)9
where K is a group of k countries and m is the respective multiplier.
As however di￿erent di￿erent groups have di￿erent means this might bias the results
and thus lead to the wrong conclusions. To take into account the di￿erent means we
will alternatively consider the coe￿cient of variation, which is de￿ned as
cvK =
qPK
j=1(mj − mK)2
mK
. (7b)
For this purpose the appropriate groups have to be de￿ned. These groups should be
found by using an appropriate measure for the ￿nancial structure.
2.1.2 Results
Figures 2, 3 and 4 not only give the grouping e￿ect according to ￿nancial structure,
but let us also assess possible convergence patterns across countries, over time and over
the periods following a shock in the money market as well as discount rates.
Overall e￿ects
Figure 2 displays convergence patterns distinguishing between money and discount
rates. We ￿nd that there is a clear trend towards a more uniform reaction of banks after
one to three months. This pattern clearly emerges in the late 1980s/ early 1990s, as the
mass of observations are in the subsamples at the beginning. However for the discount
rate multipliers there is a clear trend toward diversity over the 1990s and the beginning
of the new century. From the discussion about measuring monetary policy and the
relative importance of money market and discount rates we have to give more weight
to the money market rate, especially as the discount rate multiplier is not included in
a third of the economies involved. Summing up we cannot reject hypothesis one, even
though there seems to be a contrary development for the impact multiplier and the
reaction four to six months after the interest rate movement.
It should be noted at this stage that the convergence measures for ￿gures 2, 3 and 4
di￿er in the sense that ￿gure 2 uses the ordinary standard deviation measure, whereas
the latter ￿gures show coe￿cients of variation for obvious reasons.10
Figure 2: Variance of Multipliers11
Legal Family
Looking at the money market ￿rst, grouping according relative to legal families does
have an important in￿uence on the variation of bank behavior in the ￿rst three and
the ￿fth months after the movement in the money market and only these are shown.
The remainig months are not shown for presentational clearness. As to the impact
multiplier a signi￿cant impact cannot be found, as the French legal families response as
well as the German families response is being more and more divergent. In case of the
French family this seems to have to do with the money-market e￿ect in Belgium, which
is by far larger than in all the other economies within this group. For the German legal
family this divergence seems to be driven by the Austrian development.
There is convergence in monetary transmission in Europe in the 1990s. This conver-
gence can be observed in the ￿rst three month following a money market rate movement.
Financial Structure
Looking at ￿nancial structure from a less historical perspective and for the other
strategy that uses the Amable-factors a problematic feature is that we have to drop the
Netherlands and can only look at group three and four because we only have the UK
of his group one and for group two we only have France. Therefore it does not make
sense to look at deviation measures for the ￿rst two groups.
For the money market (￿gure 4) grouping makes sense for ￿ve out of six cases
(5th month after the change in the money market rate). Similar to the legal family
distinction a signi￿cant grouping e￿ect for the impact and the ￿rst three months after
the change in the money market rate is obtained. This seems to be robust across the
two grouping procedures.
Given convergence in Europe following a money market movement in the ￿rst three
months, the dispersion between countries with similar ￿nancial structure is further
reduced. There is a signi￿cant impact of ￿nancial structure on the convergence of the
European monetary transmission.
The conclusion is that there is a clear pattern of convergence in the money market
in the ￿rst three months following an interest rate movement. This is is even rein-
forced when we look at the grouping motivated by ￿nancial structure. Not only do
we ￿nd convergence in these months, but furthermore the variation in countries with
similar ￿nancial structure is also lower in these economies. This might be interpreted
as an indication that ￿nancial structure in￿uences the convergence of the monetary
transmission mechanism.12
Figure 3: Variation due to legal family13
Figure 4: Variation due to ￿nancial structure14
2.2 Cluster Analysis
2.2.1 Concept
The cluster approach2 turns the problem of σ-convergence upside down as from only
observing the estimated multipliers groups will be formed. It is interesting whether the
groups that are formed on the basis of some measure that will later correspond to the
groups that ￿nancial structure would predict.
For our purposes we de￿ne for each sample period n = 1,...,N and country j =
1,...,J a point
sn,j = (hj,m,0,hj,d,0,...,hj,m,p,hj,d,p) , (8)
where p are again periods ahead, h are the multipliers and m and d refer to the money
market and discount rates respectively.
Starting with sn,j groups on the basis of minimizing the distance between the country
points, groups with similar characteristics will be formed. The classical concept of
distance between points is Euclidian distance, which is de￿ned as follows. Take any two
points si = (x1,x2,...,xp) and sj = (y1,y2,...,yp), the Euclidian distance is de￿ned
by
di,j = [(x1 − y1)
2 + ... + (xp − yp)
2]
1/2.
In general there are two ways to do cluster analysis, hierarchical and non - hierar-
chical clustering. Within the ￿rst class it can be distinguished between agglomerative
and divisive methods. In case of the agglomerative method J clusters are the star-
ing points, so each country forms a cluster. The two closest clusters are successively
combined until only one cluster, which consists of the whole group, remains. Divisive
methods start from the biggest available group and step down until there are exactly
J groups. A popular way to ￿nd the closest cluster to a given cluster is the centroid
technique. For the agglomerative cluster method each cluster consists of only one point.
The centroid is the point the coordinates of which are just the mean of all coordinates
of the points in the respective cluster. So at the start each point is the centroid of its
own cluster. Then the two points the centroids of which are closest are grouped into
one cluster. Afterwords the minimal distance between the centroids of all clusters is
searched and the two clusters with the minimal distance are formed and so on until one
single cluster is left.
A popular non-hierarchical clustering technique is k-means clustering. For this
method the points are grouped into K clusters by some method. The centroids of
these clusters are calculated. Then the distance between every point in the set and the
2The discussion of cluster analysis follows closely A￿￿, Clark & May (2004), chapter 1615
centroid of each cluster is calculated. If it is closest to its own centroid the point is
kept within the group. If not it is assigned to the centroid of the group the centroid of
which it is closest. This is repeated until no point is re-assigned.
2.2.2 Results
In the following subsection another way of detecting convergence is presented. Given
the sets of multipliers for the economies, can groups be identi￿ed and if yes, do these
correspond closely to the ones, the grouping of which is motivated by theory, i.e. legal
family or ￿nancial structure groups?
For this purpose we ￿rst consider partitional clustering and look at the four group
stage given in tables 1 and 2.
Table 1: Partitional Cluster Analysis: both multipliers
group
1 2 3 4
1994 ie at de,e,f,￿,it,nl uk, be
1995 ie at, f, ￿, nl de,e,it uk,be
1996 ie at, be de,e,f,￿,it,nl uk
1997 ie at, be, f, ￿, nl de,e,it uk
1998 ie at, be de,e,it,uk nl,f,￿
1999 ie, e, uk at, be de,f,￿,it,nl it
2000 be at de,e,f,￿,ie,nl,uk it
2001 ie at, be de,e,f,￿,nl,uk it
2002 ie at, be de,f,￿ e,it,nl,uk
2003 ie at de,e,f,￿,it,nl,uk be
2004 ie at, be, f, ￿ de,nl,uk e,it
grouping ie at, be de,e,f,￿,nl,it uk
Looking at the overall e￿ect a clear separation of the Common Law system from the
Civil Law system can be observed, as both, Ireland and the UK are clearly separated
over the individual years as well as on average. The di￿erence between German and
French law system seems to be less pronounced in comparison, as France and Germany
as well as Belgium and Austria are often grouped into the same category. It is interesting
that in every year, France and Finland seem to be closest, as they are always in the
same group.
Taking the other proposed proxy for ￿nancial structure proposed by Amable, there
seems to be a clear contradiction to Amable’s (2003) results, as France (an Amable
group 2 country) an Germany (an Amable group 4 country) are grouped almost always
in the same group in this analysis. What is in line with Amable (2003) is the grouping
of Italy, Germany and Spain in the overall consideration.16
Table 2: Partitional Cluster Analysis: money market multipliers
group
1 2 3 4
1994 at de,e,ie,it f,￿,nl be,uk
1995 at de,f,￿,ie,it,nl e be,uk
1996 at de,f,￿ e,ie,it,nl be,uk
1997 at,be de,f,￿,ie,it,nl e uk
1998 at,be de,f,￿,ie,it,nl e uk
1999 at de,f,￿,ie,it,nl,uk e be
2000 at,be de,f,￿,ie,it,nl e uk
2001 at,be,uk de,f,ie,it,nl e ￿
2002 at de,e,ie,it,nl be uk,f,￿
2003 at de,f,￿,ie,it,nl e uk,be
2004 at,be de,ie,it,nl f,￿ uk
grouping at de,f,￿,ie,it,nl e uk
Additional to that a hierarchial cluster method was undertaken, which is summa-
rized in table 3. Dissimilarity between the economies increased in the late 1990s, but
decreased after 2000, which is compatible with the results obtained from the section on
sigma convergence. Another similarity can be seen in table 1 that Ireland and the UK
occupy a special position, and most European economies are grouped into one group,
which appears to be growing over time.
Table 3: Hierarchial Cluster Method
minimal distance* group
for 4 clusters 1 2 3 4
1995 0.92 at, f, ￿, nl de, e, it ie be, uk
1997 1.02 at, be de, e, f, ￿, it, nl ie uk
2000 1.03 at, be de, f, ￿, it, nl, uk e ie
2003 0.68 at, be de, f, ￿, it, nl, uk e ie
*Euclidian distance metric
Observing the pattern of monetary transmission mechanism we cannot identify
groups according to their ￿nancial structure.
Considering the subset of money market multipliers the UK still di￿ers from the
rest of Europe, but also Austria is separated. This latter observation can potentially be
attributed to the strong and dominant impact e￿ect of the Austrian money market on
bank-credit interest rates. Another di￿erence to table 1 is that Spain is nearly always
singled out. Again the di￿erence between French and German legal families does not
seem to be too strong as in the overall case. As Amable (2003) is concerned the money17
market multiplier that groups 3 and 4 (with the notable exceptions of Austria and
Spain) seem to have merged. So judging from cluster analysis we cannot fully identify
groups due to ￿nancial structure from only looking at the response of banks in the
respective economies.
2.3 Panel Regression Analysis
2.3.1 Concept
Another way to assess the impact of ￿nancial structure on monetary transmission is to
estimate it directly by a panel regression. Within this framework proxies for the ￿nancial
structure can be directly tested for their in￿uence on monetary transmission, in this
case on the multipliers of the money market as well as the discount rate multipliers.
By a panel regression the (set of) economy(ies) we are interested in can be accounted
for more directly.
More formally we have the following system:
h0,(j,t) = Zjtη + uj,t , (9a)
uj,t = µj + νjt , (9b)
where j = 1,...,J, t = 1,...,T, Zjt is a vector of ￿nancial structure variables, µj
measures the individual e￿ect in country j and νjt ∼ N(0,1) is a disturbance term.
The parameter vector η accounts for the in￿uence of ￿nancial structure on the
transmission of monetary policy impulses. We ￿rst require all the parameters to di￿er
signi￿cantly from zero. As we also take into account time we will incorporate the Euro
e￿ects and this will have of course in￿uence the estimation of the parameters.
If we were to account for changes over time, we could slightly change the speci￿cation
of equation (9b) to
uj,t = µj + λt + νjt , (9c)
where λt measures the time-speci￿c e￿ects. The model comprised of equations (9a) and
(9c) is typically referred to as a two-way panel.
The following structural variables will be used:
1. Volatility of of the money market
residuals from an ARMA(p,q) ￿tted to the money market rate
2. Capital market deepness
ratio of domestic market capitalization to GDP18
3. Degree of intermediation
(a) bank deposits to GDP and
(b) bank credits to GDP (both overall and non-￿nancial corporations)
To account for other in￿uences also in￿ation is included in the panel regression
estimates.
From the previous discussion the following expectations can be made about the
in￿uence of ￿nancial structure variables.
In an economy where ￿nancial structure matters all variables have a signi￿cant in-
￿uence on the multipliers. In countries with a higher degree of intermediation volatility
and capital market deepness exerts a lesser whereas the degree of ￿nancial intermedi-
ation exerts a higher in￿uence on the multipliers. In bank based or relationship based
economy the latter e￿ect is expected to dominate the other two and thus a negative in-
dividual e￿ect (µj), which is reversed for the market based or (arm’s length) economies.
2.3.2 Results
Of the countries investigated previously we unfortunately had to drop UK and Ireland
as for the UK there are not bank deposit series in the IFS database and for Ireland
the market capitalization is only published from 1994 onwards. Whether to include
Ireland or not is debatable, even if the data were observable, as it is expected that the
inclusion of this economy would have adverse e￿ects on the results due its fast growth
during the 1990s. As table 11 in the appendix shows there is no signi￿cant di￿erence
between the one- and the two way models, whereas the poolability tests indicate that
estimating a pooled regression is worse than estimating a panel regression model. In
order to achieve parsimony the one-way ￿xed e￿ects model was chosen. Given that
there are only 8 countries in the sample a ￿xed e￿ects model is clearly the better choice
over a random e￿ects model. Five speci￿cations were estimated.
In table 4 the variables market capitalisation( mc), bank deposits to GDP (bd) and
the yieldspread (ys) in￿uence the impact money market multiplier signi￿cantly. Start-
ing with the maximum speci￿cation as discussed above we consecutively dropped all
insigni￿cant variables until all variables were signi￿cant. This was done in a way to
avoid a decrease in the adjusted R-squared. If such a decrease occured we would have
left the otherwise insigni￿cant variable in the regression. The variable bd shows a posi-
tive in￿uence on the multiplier as expected. As the in￿uence of banks channeling funds
from households to ￿rms increases so does the rigidity of banks with respect to money
market movements. The negative coe￿cient of mc is not easily interpretable. It could
probably be explained by the fact that if banks dominate the stock market, the higher19
Table 4: Panel Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
market cap. .0005 -.0016 -.0018 -.0020 -.0019
(.0009) (.0005) (.0006) (.0006) (.0006)
bank dep./GDP -2.1510 2.7579 2.6056 2.5071 2.5713
(.5286) (.5588) (.5907) (.5828) (.5842)
yieldspread .0115 .0202 .0165 .0154 .0194
(.0181) (.0058) (.0074) (.0067) (.0076)
AT - .1980 .1896 .2004 .2333
(.054) (.0547) (.0533) (.0660)
BE* - .2735 .2981 .3112 .2959
(.0354) ( .0466) (.0442) (.0461)
DE* - -.5639 -.5429 -.5319 -.5455
(.039) (.0469) (.0449) (.0464)
E* - -.7372 -.7116 -.6972 -.7118
(.0443) (.0545) (.0524) (.0539)
F* - -.5711 -.5483 -.5322 -.5395
(.0561) (.0629) (.0622) (.0624)
FI* - -.5314 -.4924 -.4702 -.4921
(.0460) (.0666) (.0630) (.0658)
IT* - -1.0127 -.9708 -.9462 -.9685
(.1129) (.1243) (.1216) (.1229)
NL* - -.5653 -.5226 -.4972 -.5191
(.0430) (.0679) (.0645) (.0671)
t - - .0043 - -.0145
(.0053) (.0128)
t2 - - - .0006 .0017
(.0004) (.0011)
Obs. 80 80 80 80 80
Adj. R-squ. 0.1525 0.9498 0.9496 0.9505 0.9507
F-Stat. 5.74 150.55 136.25 138.99 128.06
Standard Errors in parentheses.
* relative to Austria20
their in￿uence in capital markets the lower the power of the market to compete with
the banks. This crucial implication depends on the assumption that banks are domi-
nant players in capital markets. The yield spread is the third source of in￿uence, and
it has a positive e￿ect. Considering a positive spread, when the margin between long
and short term interest rates widens, it becomes more attractive for banks to adjust
their portfolio. This is due to the fact that every adjustment is costly and therefore
only adjustment is undertaken if the gains from rebalancing the portfolio exceed the
corresponding costs. This occurs more often the bigger the spread in yields.
Financial structure signi￿cantly in￿uences the extent of monetary transmission, be-
cause ￿nancial structure factors exert a signi￿cant impact on the magnitude of trans-
mission of interest movements by European banks.
Furthermore all country dummies are signi￿cant. Belgium, which displays the lowest
intermediation ratio, has also a bigger multiplier than Austria. Netherlands and France
which usually display low degrees of intermediation have however a smaller intercept
term than Austria. This could be attributed to the fact that French and Dutch banks
are more international, which dampens the propensity of banks to react to money
market movements.
We consecutively eliminated insigni￿cant explanatory variables, still the signs were
preserved and the variables mc, bd and ys stayed signi￿cant.
From speci￿cations (3) - (5) there is no signi￿cant and common in￿uence of the
trend, neither linear nor quadratic on the impact multiplier. Also the sign of the
coe￿cients remain unchanged. As however only 10 time points could be used this
should be treated with caution. After the inclusion of various forms of trends the
in￿uence of the proxies for ￿nancial structures are reduced whereas the in￿uence of
country speci￿cs are more pronounced, which could be interpreted as an indication for
a change. The adjusted R-squared indicates that model (5) is preferred to model (3),
indicating a negative non-linear trend for h0,m.
Conclusions
This paper has several objectives. First it tries to investigate how to best assess the
impact of monetary policy on bank behavior. The result is that for the structure
of the chosen model it is best for most European countries to include the discount
rate next to the money market rate, because this exerts statistical in￿uence on bank
behavior. Secondly we ￿nd that not accounting for the change in European monetary
transmission over the last decade and only estimating a cointegration relationship misses
the essential development in European monetary policy: the convergence of the nature
of monetary transmission. This study argues that bank behavior after a money market21
rate movement has in fact synchronized over the 1990s, not at impact but at the three
months following the movement. This is even more emphasized when countries with
similar ￿nancial structure are grouped accordingly. Starting with the nature of bank
response and trying to form groups accordingly, these do not resemble groups with
similar ￿nancial structure however. Last but not least we established that there is
a signi￿cant impact of ￿nancial structure, because factors such as the ratio of bank
deposits to GDP or market capitalization to GDP as well as the term structure have a
statistically signi￿cant impact. So all in all we do not ￿nd a falsi￿cation of the three
hypotheses proposed.
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A Data Description
Table 5: Data Description
Type Label Source Range category
Austria
Base Rate dAT OENB 1M1980:9M2004 key rate
3-month interbank rate mAT WIFO 1M1980:12M1998 market rate
new emmissions rate lAT WIFO 1M1980:12M2004 lending rate
industrial production ipAT IFS 1M1980:12M2004 output
CPI cpiAT IFS 1M1980:12M2004 In￿ation
Belgium
discount rate dBE IFS 1M1980:12M1998 key rate
t-bill rate mBE IFS 1M1980:12M1998 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lBE IFS 4M1985:9M2004 lending rate
industrial production ipBE IFS 1M1980:12M2004 output
CPI cpiBE IFS 1M1980:12M2004 In￿ation
Germany
discount rate dDE BuBa 4M1980:12M1998 key rate
3-m money market rate mDE BuBa 1M1980:12M1998 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lDE IFS 1M1980:6M2003 lending rate
industrial production ipDE IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiDE IFS 1M1980:09M2004 In￿ation
Finland
HELIBOR dFI BoFi 4M1980:12M1998 key rate
3-m money market rate mFI BoFi 12M1986:12M1998 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lFI IFS 1M1980:6M2003 lending rate
industrial production ipFI IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiFI IFS 1M1980:09M2004 In￿ation
France
discount rate dFR BDF 4M1984:12M1998 key rate
to be continued ...24
Table 5: Data Description
Type Label Source Range category
3-month interbank rate mFR BDF 12M1986:12M1998 market rate
daily money market rate m1FR BDF 1M1980:12M1998 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lFR IFS 1M1980:9M2004 lending rate
industrial production ipFR IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiFR IFS 1M1980:09M2004 In￿ation
Ireland
short term credit facility dIE BoIre 1M1980:12M1998 key rate
3-m money market rate mIE BoIre 1M1980:12M1998 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lIE IFS 1M1980:9M2004 lending rate
industrial production ipIE IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiIE IFS 1M1980:09M2004 In￿ation
Italy
discount rate dIT BI 1M1980:12M1998 key rate
3-m money market rate mIT BI 1M1980:12M1998 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lIT IFS 8M1983:2M2004 lending rate
industrial production ipIT IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiIT IFS 1M1980:09M2004 In￿ation
Netherlands
Call money market rate dNL DNB 1M1980:12M1998 key rate
Aibor 3m mNL DNB 1M1980:12M1996 market rate
lending rate (corporations) lNL DNB 1M1980:10M2002 lending rate
industrial production ipNL IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiNL IFS 1M1980:09M2004 In￿ation
Spain
re￿nancing marginal rate dE BEsp. 1M1980:9M2004 key rate
o￿. interbank reference rate diE BEsp. 1M1980:9M2004 key rate
3 month interbanking rate mE BEsp. 1M1980::9M2004 market rate
Lending rate (corporations) lE IFS 1M1980:9M2004 lending rate
to be continued ...25
Table 5: Data Description
Type Label Source Range category
UK
Monthly average of El. bills dUK BoE 1M1980:10M2004 key rate
discount rate, 3 month
t-bill rate mUK IFS 1M1980:9M2004 market rate
lending rate lUK 1M2004:8M2004 lending rate
industrial production ipUK IFS 1M1980:08M2004 output
CPI cpiUK IFS 1M1980:09M2004 In￿ation
EMU Data
main re￿nancing, ￿xed rate dEMU ECB 1M1999:6M2000 key rate
main re￿nancing, min. rate dEMU ECB 6M2000:1M2005 key rate
EURIBOR, 3m mEMU BuBa 1M1999:1M2005 market rate
￿xed conversion rates - ECB - -
Table 6: Panel Regression Data
Variable Range Frequency Source
market cap. to GDP 1988:2003 y World Dev. Indicators
bank deposits 1980:2003 y IFS database
Bank credits 1980:2003 y IFS database
private sector bank credits 1980:2003 y IFS database
GDP 1980:2003 y IFS database
gvt. bond yield 1M1980:12M2003 m Datastream26
B Regression Speci￿cations
Austria
∆lat,t = α0 + α1∆lat,t−1 + β0∆dat,t + γ0∆mat,t + γ1∆dat,t−1 +
γ2∆mat,t−2 + γ3∆mat,t−3 + t (10)
Belgium
∆lbe,t = α0 + α1∆lbe,t−1 + γ0∆mbe,t + γ1∆dbe,t−1 + γ2∆mbe,t−2 +
γ5∆mbe,t−5 + γ7∆mbe,t−7 + γ8∆mbe,t−8 + t (11)
Germany
∆lde,t = α0 + β0∆dde,t + β2∆dde,t−2 + β3∆dde,t−3 + β4∆dde,t−4 +
β5∆dde,t−5 + γ0∆mde,t + t (12)
Spain
∆le,t = α0 + α1∆le,t−1 + β0∆de,t + β1∆de,t−1 + β3∆de,t−3 +
β4∆de,t−4 + β5∆de,t−5 + β7∆de,t−7 + γ0∆me,t + γ4∆me,t−4 + (13)
γ5∆me,t−5 + γ6∆me,t−6 + γ10∆me,t−10 + γ11∆me,t−11 + t
Finland
∆lfi,t = α0 + α1∆lfi,t−1 +
P5
i=0 γi∆mfi,t−i + t (14)
France
∆lf,t = α0 + α1∆lf,t−1 +
P14
i=0 γi∆mf,t−i + t (15)
Ireland
∆lie,t = α0 + α1∆lie,t−1 + β0∆die,t−0 + β1∆die,t−1 + β3∆die,t−3 +
β4∆die,t−4 + t (16)27
Italy
∆lit,t = α0 + α1∆lit,t−1 +
P2
i=0 βi∆dit,t−i + γ0∆mit,0t (17)
The Netherlands
∆lnl,t = α0 + α1∆lnl,t−1 +
P6
i=0 βi∆dnl,t−i + γ0∆mnl,0t (18)
United Kingdom
∆luk,t = α0 + α1∆luk,t−1 + β1∆duk,t−1 + β2∆duk,t−2 + β6∆duk,t−6 +
β10∆duk,t−10 + +γ0∆muk,t + t (19)
C Regression and Test Statistics
C.1 Multiplier Models - Regression Statistics28
Figure 5: Modelselection by AIC29
Figure 6: Multipliers (money market rate)30
Figure 7: Multipliers (discount rate)31
C.2 Residual Tests
As table indicates 7 we have serial correlation in Germany, France, Finland and Italy
indicating changes in the nature of the estimated relationship as when estimating the
rolling regressions this autocorrelation disappears.
The regression residuals from France, Finland and Italy display heteroskedasticity.
Thus, the rolling regressions are estimated as before, but the standard errors are calcu-
lated correcting for heteroskedasticity, which is due to White (1980) and computes the
variance - covariance matrix the following way:
b Σ =
T
T − k
(X
0X)
−1
 
T X
t=1
u
2
txtx
0
t
!
(X
0X)
−1
where ut are the OLS residuals, T is the sample size and X is a T × k matrix of
regressors.
Table 7: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test
Austria
F-statistic 16.87907 Probability 0
Obs*R-squared 44.52453 Probability 0
Belgium
F-statistic 3.675106 Probability 0.000498
Obs*R-squared 28.22671 Probability 0.000433
Germany
F-statistic 1.557115 Probability 0.160072
Obs*R-squared 9.57447 Probability 0.143754
Spain
F-statistic 1.742387 Probability 0.059768
Obs*R-squared 22.61518 Probability 0.031176
France
F-statistic 0.806678 Probability 0.44755
Obs*R-squared 1.642769 Probability 0.439822
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Table 7: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test
Finland
F-statistic 0.334148 Probability 0.937485
Obs*R-squared 2.549151 Probability 0.923351
Ireland
F-statistic 12.27252 Probability 0
Obs*R-squared 43.55738 Probability 0
Italy
F-statistic 1.292046 Probability 0.276636
Obs*R-squared 2.642507 Probability 0.266801
The Netherlands
F-statistic 2.74554 Probability 0.01316
Obs*R-squared 16.4464 Probability 0.011548
UK
F-statistic 3.416235 Probability 0.000116
Obs*R-squared 39.19506 Probability 0.000098
Table 8: White Heteroscedasticity Test
Austria
F-statistic 1.773358 Probability 0.05221
Obs*R-squared 20.7012 Probability 0.054931
Belgium
F-statistic 3.584163 Probability 0.000001
Obs*R-squared 63.22639 Probability 0.000007
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Table 8: White Heteroscedasticity Test
Germany
F-statistic 3.171316 Probability 0.000025
Obs*R-squared 50.14 Probability 0.000072
Spain
F-statistic 7.652177 Probability 0
Obs*R-squared 171.0423 Probability 0
France
F-statistic 0.296645 Probability 0.938119
Obs*R-squared 1.818618 Probability 0.935602
Finland
F-statistic 1.361072 Probability 0.14832
Obs*R-squared 26.35834 Probability 0.1543
Ireland
F-statistic 65.63948 Probability 0
Obs*R-squared 224.3686 Probability 0
Italy
F-statistic 0.15187 Probability 0.998807
Obs*R-squared 1.579833 Probability 0.998664
The Netherlands
F-statistic 10.1433 Probability 0
Obs*R-squared 116.7338 Probability 0
UK
F-statistic 10.1882 Probability 0
Obs*R-squared 155.1124 Probability 034
Table 9: Normality Tests
Austria Ireland
Jarque-Bera 381.33 Jarque-Bera 15941
probability 0 probability 0
Belgium Italy
Jarque-Bera 50.06 Jarque-Bera 90437
probability 0 probability 0
Germany The Netherlands
Jarque-Bera 6629.62 Jarque-Bera 726.51
probability 0 probability 0
Finland Spain
Jarque-Bera 5538.70 Jarque-Bera 1649
probability 0 probability 0
France UK
Jarque-Bera 390.81 Jarque-Bera 2538.9
probability 0 probability 035
C.3 Panel Regression Tests
Table 10: Variable description
Variable Description Calculation
MC Market capitalization as a share of GDP obt. from the DB (7 yr. ma*)
bd Bank deposits to GDP obt. from the DB (7 yr. ma*)
bpuc public bank loans to GDP obt. from the DB (7 yr. ma*)
(total loans - private loans)
bpc Bank credits to GDP obt. from the DB
(excl. public loans) (7 yr. ma*)
inf last year’s In￿ation (1994, ..., 2003)
ys Spread between government return (gvt. bonds) - mmrate
bonds and 3-month mmrates
vola Volatility of the money market s.e. of ￿tted ARMA processes
from the mmr (2yr. ma*)
* ma = moving average
Table 11: Poolability Tests
pooled one-way two-way
rss 2.2054 0.29442 0.22998
df 7 64 55
Fstat. Fcrit d￿crit
ols vs 1w 59.3431735 2.15 (n-1,nt-n-k)
ols vs 2w 67.48916055 2.18 (n-1,nt-n-t-k+1)
1w vs 2w 0.240795395 1.54 (nt-n-k,nt-n-t-k+1)About ENEPRI 
he European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) is composed of leading 
socio-economic research institutes in practically all EU member states and candidate countries that 
are committed to working together to develop and consolidate a European agenda of research. 
ENEPRI was launched in 2000 by the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), which 
provides overall coordination for the initiative.  
While the European construction has made gigantic steps forward in the recent past, the European 
dimension of research seems to have been overlooked. The provision of economic analysis at the 
European level, however, is a fundamental prerequisite to the successful understanding of the 
achievements and challenges that lie ahead. ENEPRI aims to fill this gap by pooling the research efforts 
of its different member institutes in their respective areas of specialisation and to encourage an explicit 
European-wide approach. 
 
ENEPRI is composed of the following member institutes: 
CASE  Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland 
CEE  Center for Economics and Econometrics, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey 
CEPII  Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, Paris, France 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium 
CERGE-EI  Centre for Economic Research and Graduated Education, Charles University, Prague, 
Czech Republic 
CPB  Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands 
DIW  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Germany 
ESRI  Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
ETLA  Research Institute for the Finnish Economy, Helsinki, Finland 
FEDEA  Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Madrid, Spain 
FPB  Federal Planning Bureau, Brussels, Belgium 
IE-BAS  Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Bratislava, Slovakia 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Ljubljana, Slovenia 
IHS  Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria 
ISAE  Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica, Rome, Italy 
NIER  National Institute of Economic Research, Stockholm, Sweden 
NIESR  National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, UK 
NOBE  Niezalezny Osrodek Bana Ekonomicznych, Lodz, Poland 
PRAXIS  Center for Policy Studies, Tallinn, Estonia 
RCEP  Romanian Centre for Economic Policies, Bucharest, Romania 
SSB    Research Department, Statistics Norway, Oslo, Norway 
SFI    Danish National Institute of Social Research, Copenhagen, Denmark 
TÁRKI  Social Research Centre Inc., Budapest, Hungary 
 
ENEPRI  publications include three series: Research Reports, which consist of papers presenting the 
findings and conclusions of research undertaken in the context of ENEPRI research projects; Working 
Papers, which constitute dissemination to a wider public of research undertaken and already published by 
ENEPRI partner institutes on their own account; and thirdly, Occasional Papers (closed series) containing 
a synthesis of the research presented at workshops organised during the first years of the network’s 
existence. 
 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes 
c/o Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1 ▪ 1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: 32(0) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: 32(0) 219.41.51 
Website: http//:www.enepri.org ▪ E-mail: info@enepri.org 
T 